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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This has been one of the most important periods for bankruptcy law 
developments since the authors began writing for the Survey. On the one hand, 
the Fifth Circuit decided several important cases of particular importance to 
Chapter 11: Village at Camp Bowie, Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, and MPF 
Holdings, among others. These cases, whether one agrees or disagrees with the 
results, stand for the proposition that bankruptcy is equitable and flexible and 
that, within the confines of the law, the bankruptcy courts should have 
sufficient equitable discretion to arrive at appropriate results. In other words, 
the days of the Fifth Circuit attempting to tell the bankruptcy courts how to 
decide cases by a talismanic approach appear to be coming to an end. 
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit issued several opinions that threaten the 
very structure of the Bankruptcy Code. In two opinions, the Fifth Circuit held 
that parties may not consent to the entry of a final order in a non-core 
proceeding. Although this issue is presently before the Supreme Court and will 
likely be decided prior to the publication of this Survey (or shortly thereafter), 
the inability to consent to final orders severely curtails the ability of the 
bankruptcy court to function as a centralized forum for adjudicating all estate 
disputes. Separately, the Fifth Circuit severely curtailed the power of section 
1146(c) of the Code by holding that service of a proposed plan is insufficient to 
strip a secured creditor of his lien, if the secured creditor has not actively 
participated in the case (such as by filing a claim). Thus, even as the Fifth Circuit 
continues its pro-equitable approach with respect to deciding the merits of a 
case, it continues to threaten or to remove from bankruptcy courts the very tools 
that enable the process to function properly. 
Lower courts have not seen much activity due to the general slowdown in 
bankruptcy filings. As a result, they published few bankruptcy opinions of 
particular note. However, even if the slowdown continues into the foreseeable 
future (which the authors do not believe will be the case), future Survey periods 
are likely to see a large volume of lower court opinions as bankruptcy courts will 
continue to struggle with interpreting and applying the changes to their 
fundamental structure in the wake of Stern v. Marshall and its progeny. 
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II.  CHAPTER 11 PLANS 
A.  ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE INDIVIDUAL CASES—IN RE LIVELY1 
Practitioners know that the absolute priority rule, applicable on cramdown, 
prohibits any junior class from receiving or retaining anything under a Chapter 
11 plan unless a senior class accepts the plan or is satisfied in full. In the wake of 
the 2005 amendments, the question is how the absolute priority rule applies in 
an individual Chapter 11 case.2 The Fifth Circuit addressed the question in In re 
Lively. The first problem is that the Circuit Court had to address the issue at all—
this is another opinion resulting from sloppy drafting in the 2005 amendments 
which took a (mostly) pristine and internally consistent Code and slapped a 
hodgepodge of special interest “fixes” to perceived “problems,” which resulted in 
more problems for the courts to work through. 
The debtor’s Chapter 13 case was converted to Chapter 11 because a creditor 
filed a claim large enough to disqualify the debtor from Chapter 13 relief.3 The 
debtor proposed a plan that retained ownership of various assets, and paid the 
unsecured creditors a small dividend, but one that exceeded the liquidation value 
of the debtor’s assets.4 The unsecured class rejected the plan, and the issue was 
whether the absolute priority rule applies in an individual Chapter 11 case. The 
more precise issue was the scope of the exception to the absolute priority rule for 
individuals as a result of the 2005 amendments. 
Specifically, the amendment provides that 
The holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such class 
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior claim or 
interest any property; except that in a case in which the debtor is an 
individual, the debtor may retain property included in the estate under 
section 1115.5 
The ambiguity arises from the reference to section 1115: section 1115 brings 
into the estate not only the property that existed as of the petition date and is 
property of the estate under section 541(a) of the Code, but it also brings into 
the estate that property acquired postpetition. Thus, does the exception apply to 
all property of the estate, or only to that property of the estate acquired 
postpetition? 
The Circuit Court, through Judge Edith Jones, held that the exception 
applies only to postpetition property, such that the debtor may be able to retain 
property acquired postpetition but not property heldas of the petition date.6 The 
court appeared to agree that the amendment is ambiguous (though it did not 
expressly so hold) and that its legislative history is “unenlightening.”7 The 
 
 1. In re Lively, 717 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 2. See 11 U.S.C. § 101. 
 3. See In re Lively, 717 F.3d at 407. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. at 408 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)). 
 6. See id. at 409. 
 7. Id. at 408. 
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Circuit Court nevertheless applied statutory interpretation guides and 
concluded that limiting the amendment to postpetition property would be 
unambiguous and correct while adopting the alternative would have the effect of 
repealing by implication the absolute priority rule for individual debtors.8 The 
second point (repeal by implication) was correctly noted by the court and its 
logic is correct—reading the amendment broadly would effectively repeal the 
absolute priority rule for individuals. 
But, perhaps this is precisely what Congress intended: there is no absolute 
priority rule in Chapter 13, and the amendment, appearing in section 
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the Code, applies to both corporate and individual debtors.9 
In other words, it would be odd indeed for Congress to insert an exception to 
the absolute priority rule if Congress intended to repeal the absolute priority 
rule. If the amendment applied solely to an individual case, then that would be 
the effect and the Circuit’s logic would be correct (Congress would hardly be 
providing an exception to something that it intended to write out of the Code). 
But, because the amendment applies to both corporate and individual cases, it is 
just as logical to conclude that Congress’ precise intention was to repeal the 
absolute priority rule in toto in individual cases, while retaining it for corporate 
debtors. The language may be less than perfect, but that is only because 
Congress inserted the language into an existing global subsection of the statute, 
instead of having a separate subsection of the statute applicable only to 
individuals. What is more logical and what leads to a less absurd result: that 
Congress intended to repeal the absolute priority rule in toto for Chapter 11 
debtors, as is the case for Chapter 13, or that Congress intended to repeal the 
absolute priority rule just in part, such that non-exempt postpetition property 
could be retained but prepetition non-exempt property could not? 
The result is that, without consent of unsecured creditors, the debtor must 
liquidate property and pay them less than what they would receive in liquidation, 
because the circuit concluded that the plan offered the unsecured creditors 
more than a liquidation. This is absurd. True, one may say that this is the same 
result in a corporate Chapter 11 case, and that there is therefore nothing absurd 
about the result. And true, it may be unfair for a debtor to retain non-exempt 
property when his creditors are not being paid in full. But the question is still 
the value of that property, and if the creditors receive more as a result of the 
debtor keeping the property, instead of liquidating it, then the result is indeed 
absurd. Also, in an individual Chapter 11 case, where an unsecured creditor 
objects to confirmation, the debtor is required to provide value equal to the 
claim or to pay over his projected disposable income for five years or more 
following confirmation.10 
The court could just as easily have ruled the other way without violating 
statutory construction principles and without doing violence to the Code. The 
amendment states that “the debtor may retain property included in the estate 
under section 1115.”11 The amendment does not state that “the debtor may 
 
 8. Id. at 409. 
 9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 10. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15). 
 11. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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retain property included in the estate only under section 1115,” or “included in 
the estate by section 1115.” Section 1115 provides that property of the estate, in 
Chapter 11, “includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 . . . 
.”12 Thus, even a simple reading of section 1115 demonstrates that it says two 
things: property of the estate in Chapter 11 includes prepetition property and 
postpetition property. Reading the word “included” as a verb i.e., that section 
1115 must be doing the inclusion of property itself for the amendment to 
apply—as the circuit did—does not change the result because section 1115 
“includes” property of the estate with respect to prepetition property as well as 
postpetition property. 
More than anything, though, if the purpose of the amendment was to make 
an individual Chapter 11 plan function more like a Chapter 13 plan—as the 
court noted it was—then why would a Chapter 11 individual debtor not be 
permitted to retain non-exempt property, provided that the best interests and 
disposable income tests are satisfied, when his Chapter 13 cousin would be 
permitted to retain such property? The Circuit Court may well be correct on a 
technical reading of the statute. But the statute is part of a comprehensive 
overall statutory scheme and must be read in that light and with the 
fundamental policies underpinning the Code in mind. It is also odd for the 
Fifth Circuit to rest on a technical application of the statute, when at the same 
time it applies judicial gloss that perpetrates substantial violence on other clear 
statutory provisions (such as 1146(c) discussed in this Survey and the ability to 
consent to a judgment in non-core proceedings). It is even odder that, as a result 
of this opinion, the debtor cannot reorganize unless the debtor surrenders non-
exempt property, and if the debtor does so, unsecured creditors might actually 
receive less than they would under the plan. 
Yet the oddest thing about the Lively decision is the very logic employed by 
the Circuit Court. According to the court, the amendments addressed the 
inequitable result that an individual Chapter 11 debtor, prior to the 
amendments, would have to account to his creditors only for property as of the 
petition date, and could keep postpetition property to himself: “[b]efore the 
BAPCPA [Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consume Protection Act] 
amendments, however, an individual Chapter 11 debtor would only have to 
satisfy the absolute priority rule with assets that were ‘property of the estate’ at 
the date of filing for relief; the individual debtor’s personal post-petition 
earnings were not subject to liability to satisfy his creditors.”13 The amendments 
“remedied this potential inequity in Chapter 11 by adding to the § 541 
definition the individual debtor’s post-petition earnings and property 
acquisitions.”14 This is certainly correct, but what then is the ultimate result 
under Lively? Congress intended that a debtor’s postpetition assets be available 
to satisfy creditors, yet under Lively, those are precisely the assets that a debtor 
can shield against the effects of the absolute priority rule. The circuit noted an 
ambiguity, the circuit applied standard statutory interpretation guides, and the 
circuit may even have struggled with the analysis to reach its conclusion. While 
 
 12. 11 U.S.C. § 1115(a). 
 13. Lively, 717 F.3d at 409. 
 14. Id. 
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its answer may be technically correct, the result is absurd and inequitable to 
debtors and to creditors. That should have been the beginning and the end of 
inquiry. 
The authors have devoted considerable discussion to this opinion because 
they do not believe that this opinion is consistent with the Code or its policies, 
and they hope that their views may help a future litigant convince the courts 
that the result should be overturned. 
B.  ARTIFICIAL IMPAIRMENT—VILLAGE AT CAMP BOWIE15 
In order to confirm a plan on cramdown of a class of creditors, at least one 
impaired class of non-insider creditors must accept the plan.16 What happens 
when the debtor has enough funds to pay unsecured creditors in full at 
confirmation, as is seen in some real estate cases where there may be one large 
secured creditor with a large deficiency (i.e., unsecured claim), along with 
multiple minor unsecured creditors whose claims can be easily paid? 
Classification issues aside, may the debtor artificially impair a class—in other 
words, not pay the class in full right away even though the debtor could do so—
in order to obtain an impaired class for voting and cramdown purposes? As 
discussed in the prior Survey, Judge D. Michael Lynn of the Bankruptcy Court 
for the Northern District of Texas held that the debtor could artificially impair a 
class of creditors, in certain situations.17 On direct appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed. 
The case involved real estate, rather typical of many of the recent Chapter 11 
filings, where the debtor leased commercial property.18 The debtor had one large 
secured creditor, and numerous small trade creditors.19 The plan classified 
thirty-eight trade creditors, proposed to pay them in full within three months of 
confirmation, and the class voted for the plan.20 The secured creditor objected, 
arguing that the debtor had artificially impaired the trade creditors because: (i) 
the slight delay in payment was not true impairment; and (ii) the debtor could 
pay the trade creditors in full and delayed their payment only to engineer an 
impaired class.21 To its credit, the debtor admitted at the confirmation hearing 
that it could pay the class in full, but that it intentionally impaired the class for 
cramdown purposes. 
The court noted that “[c]ircuits have divided over the question of whether § 
1129(a)(10) draws a distinction between artificial and economically driven 
impairment.”22 The Circuit Court also noted that, while its prior precedent was 
unclear on the issue, it had voiced concern over artificial impairment and had 
remanded a case to the bankruptcy court to consider the issue in light of the 
 
 15. Western Real Estate Equities, L.L.C. v. Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P. (In re Village at 
Camp Bowie I, L.P.), 710 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 16. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10). 
 17. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 454 B.R. 702 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011). 
 18. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 242. 
 19. Id. at 243. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. at 243. 
 22. Id. at 244. 
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good faith requirement under section 1129(a) of the Code.23 Nevertheless, the 
Fifth Circuit rejected the Windsor precedent from the Eight Circuit that 
prohibited artificial impairment: 
We expressly reject Windsor . . . § 1129(a)(10) does not distinguish between 
discretionary and economically driven impairment . . . § 1124 provides 
that any alteration of a creditor’s rights, no matter how minor, constitutes 
‘impairment.’ By shoehorning a motive inquiry and materiality 
requirement into § 1129(a)(10), Windsor warps the text of the Code, 
requiring a court to ‘deem’ a claim unimpaired for purposes of § 
1129(a)(10) even though it plainly qualifies as impaired under § 1124. 
Windsor’s motive inquiry is also inconsistent with § 1123(b)(1), which 
provides that a plan proponent may impair or leave unimpaired any class 
of claims, and does not contain any indication that impairment must be 
driven by economic motives.24 
Addressing the lender’s argument that this was akin to the same kind of 
gerrymandering prohibited by Greystone, the circuit rejected the argument that 
Greystone prohibits all “voting manipulation.”25 Rather, Greystone addressed an 
ambiguity created by section 1122 of the Code, but it did not “stand for the 
proposition that a court can ride roughshod over affirmative language in the 
Bankruptcy Code to enforce some Platonic ideal of a fair voting process.”26 
The overall issue is good faith under the Code and the requirement that the 
plan not be forbidden by law.27 
Good faith should be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding establishment of the plan, mindful of the purposes underlying 
the Bankruptcy Code. Generally, where a plan is proposed with the 
legitimate and honest purpose to reorganize and has a reasonable hope of 
success, the good faith requirement of § 1129(a)(3) is satisfied.28 
As the court noted, the bankruptcy court found good faith and that finding was 
not error: the debtor proposed a feasible plan that would allow it to repay its 
debts, to preserve equity, and to stay current under its plan.29 As is discussed in 
greater detail in Judge Lynn’s opinion, the plan pays the lender in full, while the 
lender purchased its claim for a discount and was contesting the plan in order to 
gain control over the collateral and have the benefit of the equity in the 
collateral.30 In other words, and although unspoken by the courts, the debtor 
was free to resort to reasonable tactics to contest the lender’s questionable 
motives. 
The Fifth Circuit cautioned, however, that its opinion was not a blank check 
 
 23. See id. at 245. 
 24. Id. at 245–46 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 25. Id. at 247. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 29. See id. at 247–48. 
 30. See In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 454 B.R. at 709–10. 
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to manipulate the Code or the progress: 
We do not suggest that a debtor’s methods for achieving literal compliance 
with § 1129(a)(10) enjoy a free pass from scrutiny under § 1129(a)(3). . . . 
An inference of bad faith might be stronger where a debtor creates an 
impaired accepting class out of whole cloth by incurring a debt with a 
related party. . . . Ultimately, the § 1129(a)(3) inquiry is fact-specific, fully 
empowering the bankruptcy courts to deal with chicanery. We will 
continue to accord deference to their determinations.31 
This is perhaps the broader import of In re Village at Camp Bowie: bankruptcy 
relief is equitable in nature and often fact specific, and, while the debtor was 
permitted to artificially impair in this case, it is for the bankruptcy court to 
weigh all of the facts and circumstances of a particular case and the bankruptcy 
court’s decision will be entitled to deference. The circuit’s conclusion was 
substantially the same in Texas Grant Prairie Hotel Realty, discussed below. And, it 
is no coincidence that Judge Higginbotham authored both opinions. 
C.  CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE SECURED CLAIMS—TEXAS GRAND PRAIRIE 
HOTEL REALTY 
For the first time in decades, and for the first time since the Supreme Court’s 
Till32 opinion, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the issue of the appropriate cramdown 
rate of interest on a secured claim in a Chapter 11 plan, in Texas Grand Prairie 
Hotel Realty, LLC.33 
The plan, covering four Hyatt Place hotels, provided for a 5% interest rate to 
the secured lender. Because no agreement could be reached with the lender, the 
plan proceeded on cramdown. Of note, the 5% rate was more than twice the 
contract rate (the contract rate being a London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
based rate), 1.75% more than the Prime Rate, and almost twice the Treasury Bill 
rate. The lender, using the market rate approach, advocated a rate of 8.8%. Both 
the debtors and the lender argued that Till, while not controlling (as it was a 
Chapter 13 case), provided persuasive guidance on the cramdown rate issue. 
Thus, the case came down to what methodology should apply to calculate the 
cramdown rate: must one methodology apply in Chapter 11 and, if so, must it 
be the market rate of interest? 
In Till, the Supreme Court adopted the “formula” approach and held that, 
for Chapter 13 at least, the cramdown interest rate should start with a 
benchmark, the Prime Rate, and then be adjusted upward based on risk, usually 
within a 1–3% interest adjustment range. Any higher adjustment could raise 
serious concerns regarding feasibility, and denial of confirmation based on 
feasibility would probably be the result. However, in Till, the Supreme Court 
stated in a footnote that, in Chapter 11, it may make sense to look at the rate 
 
 31. In re Village at Camp Bowie I, L.P., 710 F.3d at 248. 
 32. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
 33. Wells Fargo N.A. v. Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C. (In re Texas Grand Prairie 
Hotel Realty, L.L.C.), 710 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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that the market would charge, if there is an efficient market.34 This led to 
substantial dispute as to what was meant by the Court, if anything. One circuit, 
for example, concluded that the market rate must apply if there is an efficient 
market.35 Prior to Till, the Fifth Circuit had not adopted any particular 
methodology, although it had held that the appropriate rate should factor in a 
risk component, and it affirmed rates based loosely on the contract rate or the 
Treasury Bill rate.36 
The market rate approach advocated by the lender in Texas Grand Prarie 
Realty, L.L.C. was as follows. The lender’s expert looked to the loan-to-values 
ratio of the cramdown loan, noted that no single lender would be willing to 
extend such a loan, and then broke the loan out into three tranches based on 
differing loan-to-value and therefore risk.37 Each tranche was priced separately 
based on the risk, with the last tranche being the return expected of equity, or 
22%.38 The expert then blended the rates on the three tranches to arrive at his 
8.8% rate.39 Not surprisingly, this rate could not be sustained by the debtors or 
by the lender’s collateral, and would have defeated the plan based on feasibility. 
This methodology is familiar to debtor’s counsel, as one that always leads to the 
highest rate and whose purpose is not to arrive at a reasonable rate, but a rate 
that defeats any otherwise feasible plan. Lender’s counsel would probably 
disagree, but it is hard to refute that this approach always leads to the highest 
rate. While the lender based its methodology on the famous Till footnote, the 
fact was that even the lender’s expert agreed that no efficient market existed for 
the cramdown loan. 
The debtors’ expert, on the other hand, applied Till by beginning with the 
Prime Rate, 3.5%, and then adjusted upward by 1.75% to account for the 
various factors identified in Till, including the circumstances of the bankruptcy 
case, the quality of the collateral, management, operations, and others.40 The 
lender argued that this was a “holistic” approach that could not be reproduced 
objectively by a different expert; in other words, that it was purely subjective and 
a number picked from thin air. Yet, if that is true, then that is exactly what Till 
provides for. Moreover, the other identified approaches, including the contract 
rate and the Treasury Bill benchmark approach, would have led to a rate even 
lower than 5%. Thus, although the lender complained that the 5% rate was too 
low, it was more than contract and more than other identified cramdown rate 
methodologies. 
The Fifth Circuit first addressed the lender’s argument that, although the 
 
 34. Till, 541 U.S. at 503 n.20. 
 35. Bank of Montreal v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re American 
Homepatient Inc.), 420 F.3d 559, 568 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 36. Fin. Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. 
P’ship), 116 F.3d 790, 800 (5th Cir. 1997); Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enters. 
Ltd., II (In re Briscoe Enters. Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1169 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 37. See Brief of Appellant at 18, In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324 
(2013). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Brief of Appellees at 49, In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d 324 
(2013). 
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bankruptcy court’s overall findings are questions of fact, the choice of which 
cramdown rate methodology to apply was a question of law, and that the circuit 
should adopt the market rate approach as the appropriate methodology.41 The 
circuit rejected this invitation, reiterating its prior precedent to the effect that it 
would not “tie the hands of the lower courts as they make the factual 
determination involved in establishing an appropriate interest rate.”42 Thus, the 
Circuit “declined to establish a particular formula for the cramdown interest 
rate in Chapter 11 cases.”43 These holdings drove the balance of the analysis: 
because the overall issue was one of fact, and because no particular methodology 
for determining the appropriate rate was required, the bankruptcy court did not 
commit clear error in finding the debtors’ formula approach more appropriate 
for the circumstances than the lender’s market approach. Thus, the Till 
approach was an appropriate approach for the Chapter 11 cramdown rate: 
A bankruptcy court should begin its cramdown rate analysis with the 
national prime rate—the rate charged by banks to creditworthy commercial 
borrowers—and then add a supplemental risk adjustment to account for 
such factors as the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, 
and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan. Though the 
plurality did not decide the proper scale for the risk adjustment, it 
observed that other courts have generally approved adjustments of 1% to 
3%.44 
The court also noted that the lender’s expert’s method was incompatible with 
Till, because the expert did not begin with the Prime Rate, but rather with the 
market rate. The circuit also quoted the bankruptcy court’s reasoning 
(Bankruptcy Judge Russell F. Nelms of the Northern District of Texas): 
I disagree with [the lender’s] approach because it establishes a benchmark 
before adjustment that I just view to be completely inconsistent with Till. 
Till set that benchmark at national prime, but according to [the lender], 
you first determine what level any portion of a loan would be financeable, 
and then you begin to work from there. The Court finds no support for 
that type of analysis in Till. If anything this strikes the Court as more in the 
nature of a forced loan approach that the majority in Till expressly 
rejected.45 
Importantly, just as the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt the market rate 
approach as the only permissible approach, the court did not adopt the Till 
approach as the only permissible approach or even the optimal approach.46 
Rather, it was for the bankruptcy court to apply the appropriate methodology to 
the facts, and applying the Till formula approach for this case—especially where 
there was no efficient market—was not clear error. Therein lies the importance 
 
 41. In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, L.L.C., 710 F.3d at 330. 
 42. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 43. Id. at 330–31. 
 44. Id. at 331 (internal quotations omitted). 
 45. Id. at 335. 
 46. See id. at 337. 
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of Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty: not necessarily the result, or an (arguably) 
debtor friendly approach, or even the approval of the Till approach, but rather 
the rejection of any specific approach as governing, thereby confirming and 
enabling the equitable nature and functioning of the bankruptcy court (after 
years, it seems, of the circuit trying to tell bankruptcy courts how they should 
decide cases as a matter of law, as opposed to a matter of fact and of equity). 
Together the Fifth Circuit’s rulings on Texas Grand Prairie Hotel and Camp 
Bowie, have once again made Chapter 11 secured creditor cramdown a viable 
option, which will serve to ensure that secured creditors have a downside to 
confirmation, thus motivating them to work reasonably towards the consensual 
resolution that Chapter 11 strives to achieve. These opinions, more than 
anything, have again leveled the confirmation playing field in the Fifth Circuit. 
D.  CRAMDOWN INTEREST RATE UNSECURED CLAIMS—IN RE TEXAS STAR 
REFRESHMENTS47 
Few recent opinions consider the appropriate rate of interest that must be 
paid to an unsecured class being crammed down in Chapter 11. Judge Jones, of 
the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, considered this issue 
in In re Texas Star Refreshments L.L.C., all the more relevant because he did so in 
light of the Fifth Circuit’s Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty opinion. 
The debtor’s plan separately classified a large unsecured creditor, who rejected 
the plan. The plan proposed an interest rate of 5% to the unsecured creditor, 
and that rate provided for a prepetition judgment against the debtor pursuant to 
separate law. The issue was whether the 5% rate to the unsecured creditor 
complied with the “fair and equitable” requirement to cramdown an unsecured 
class. In the process, the opinion attempts to address one of the arguments made 
against the Prime-plus approach approved of by the Fifth Circuit in Texas Grand 
Prairie Hotel Realty. One of the arguments against the result in Texas Grand Prairie 
Hotel Realty is that it leads to an absurd result where a secured creditor is paid an 
interest rate that is lower than what the market would have charged for a well 
collateralized, fully secured, credit worthy loan. In In re Texas Star Refreshments 
L.L.C., the unsecured class would receive a lower interest rate under the plan 
than the secured class, even though the risk of nonpayment under the plan was 
clearly higher. If the interest rate is meant to compensate for the risk of 
nonpayment, then the unsecured creditor should arguably receive a higher rate, 
according to the creditor’s argument. The court addressed this issue as follows: 
At first blush it appears that an unsecured creditor should receive a higher 
interest rate than a secured creditor, given the risk of non-payment. This 
analysis fails, however, when the relative risks of liquidation and 
confirmation are considered. A secured creditor’s risk may increase given a 
debtor’s continued use of the creditor’s collateral. An unsecured creditor’s 
prospects of repayment may indeed be enhanced if the debtor survives and 
the only other real alternative is liquidation. Such is the case here. If the 
TSR Plan fails, liquidation is likely with First Bank foreclosing its liens. 
Unsecured creditors, and specifically CFG, will receive no dividend on 
 
 47. In re Texas Star Refreshments L.L.C., 494 B.R. 684 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2013). 
112 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 1 
account of their claims. The risk that CFG will not be repaid is far greater 
upon liquidation. CFG did not bargain for a 5% rate, but there is clearly 
no market for a $900,000+ unsecured loan to an insolvent company. 
While there is arguably a risk component required for any present value 
analysis, there is no clear standard for setting the proper rate.48 
Accordingly, the court applied the Till formula approach and the rationale of 
Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty to the cramdown of an unsecured creditor, 
resulting in the approval of the 5% rate to unsecured creditors. Of note, the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas soon thereafter arrived at 
the same conclusion, and applied the formula approach to an unsecured, 
deficiency claim.49 
E.  CRAMDOWN SALES AND INDUBITABLE EQUIVALENT—RADLAX GATEWAY 
HOTEL LLC50 
Is a cramdown sale that seeks to take away the secured creditor’s credit bid 
rights subject to the indubitable equivalent standard or to the cramdown sale 
standard? The Supreme Court considered this issue in RadLAX Gateway Hotel 
LLC v. Amalgamated Bank. 
The debtor proposed a cramdown sale of the lender’s collateral, a hotel and 
associated commercial realty, free and clear of the lender’s liens.51 With the 
same, the debtor sought the approval of auction and bid procedures that denied 
the lender its credit bid rights under section 363(k) of the Code.52 This directly 
violated section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Code, which provides that a cramdown 
sale of collateral must be subject to the creditor’s credit bid rights. For this 
reason, the lower courts rejected the bid procedures and the plan. The debtor, 
however, argued that section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) of the Code applied, and that 
cramdown was possible because the treatment offered was the indubitable 
equivalent of the lender’s claim.53 
The Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument: “[W]e find the debtors’ 
reading of § 1129(b)(2)(A)—under which clause (iii) permits precisely what clause 
(ii) proscribes—to be hyperliteral and contrary to common sense.”54 Employing 
established statutory construction, the Court held that the more specific 
statutory provision—section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)—applied, as it was most on point.55 
After all, the plan proposed a sale of the collateral. Although the Court agreed 
that section 1129(b)(2)(A) provides three distinct and disjunctive avenues for 
cramdown, the Court simply found that the plan was a sale plan and therefore 
the cramdown sale provision, and not the indubitable equivalent provision, 
applies regardless of how the debtor characterizes the cramdown avenue it seeks 
 
 48. Id. at 701–02. 
 49. See In re LMR, L.L.C., 496 B.R. 410 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013). 
 50. RadLAX Gateway Hotel LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012). 
 51. See id. at 2068–69. 
 52. See id. at 2069–70. 
 53. See id. at 2070. 
 54. Id. 
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to employ: “[d]ebtors seeking to sell their property free of liens under § 
1129(b)(2)(A) must satisfy the requirements of clause (ii), not the requirements 
of both clauses (ii) and (iii).”56 
This opinion is important, not only because it clarifies the issue, but also 
because it effectively reverses the Fifth Circuit’s holding in In the Matter of Pacific 
Lumber, 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009). In that opinion, the Circuit held that 
section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) was not the exclusive cramdown avenue for a sale plan, 
and that credit bid rights could be taken away even in a plan cramdown sale 
under the indubitable equivalent avenue of section 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii). 
Practitioners are cautioned not to rely on Pacific Lumber if they propose a 
cramdown sale plan without protecting the lender’s credit bid rights. 
Practitioners are also reminded that section 363(k) of the Code—which is 
explicitly referenced in section 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)—is not absolute. The bankruptcy 
court has the power under section 363(k) to deny credit bidding.57 Depending 
on the facts, it may be that addressing the actual right to credit bid, or asserting 
that cause exists to deny the same, may be preferable and less risky on appeal 
than using section 1129(b)(2)(A) to deny credit bidding outright. 
III.  CLAIM PRESERVATION (POSTCONFIRMATION STANDING) 
A.  COMPTON V. ANDERSON (IN RE MPF HOLDINGS US, LLC) 
The authors have discussed multiple opinions addressing claim retention 
under confirmed plans in prior Surveys. One that they had criticized, together 
with multiple commentators, was Judge Bohm’s sua sponte opinion in In re MPF 
Holdings, from the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas.58 Judge 
Bohm held that, in order to preserve a cause of action under a Chapter 11 plan 
under United Operating, the plan must specifically name the defendants, set forth 
the legal basis for the claim, and inform the defendants that they will be sued 
(not that they might be sued).59 
As predicted, the Fifth Circuit reversed on direct appeal.60 The circuit 
reaffirmed that, under its United Operating standard, a plan must “specifically 
and unequivocally” preserve a cause of action.61 The Circuit noted that it had 
clarified the standard in Texas Wyoming (issued after Judge Bohm’s opinion), and 
that Texas Wyoming found that avoidance actions were sufficiently preserved 
even though the plan did not necessarily identify the defendants to be sued 
postconfirmation.62 Thus, the court concluded that “the reasons relied upon by 
the bankruptcy court for finding that the Reorganization Plan did not contain a 
sufficiently unequivocal reservation are not supported by our case law.”63 
 
 56. Id. at 2072 (emphasis in original). 
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The Fifth Circuit’s opinion is included in this Survey not because of any new 
precedent that it establishes, but rather to note that In re MPF Holdings has been 
reversed. Moreover, the opinion continues to recognize, as announced in Texas 
Wyoming, that the “specific and unequivocal” standard is not the talismanic and 
hyper-technical requirement that some have argued it is, or that it should be. 
IV.  CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
A.  THRASHER V. MANDEL (IN RE MANDEL) 
In In re Mandel, Chief Judge Brenda T. Rhoades of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas considered the issue of 
whether a claim to a constructive trust under Texas law is a “claim” under the 
Bankruptcy Code that is subject to the bar date.64 In this case, the creditor 
obtained allowed claims against the debtor for millions of dollars, including 
claims for fraud and breach of duty.65 The creditor timely filed a proof of claim 
for the allowed claims, but did not assert a constructive trust claim prior to the 
bar date.66 Instead, after the bar date and in the middle of a lengthy claims 
allowance trial, the creditor filed an adversary proceeding seeking to impose a 
constructive trust against property of the estate alleged to have been the result of 
the tortious actions. The creditor argued that the constructive trust claim was 
not a “claim” and that it could only have been asserted by way of adversary 
proceeding and not by proof of claim.67 
The court noted that constructive trust is a remedy under Texas law and not a 
cause of action by itself.68 The Bankruptcy Code defines “claim” as including a 
right to an equitable remedy when monetary damages are also available.69 The 
constructive trust action, because no constructive trust had been imposed 
prepetition, was therefore a “claim.”70 The court also acknowledged that a 
constructive trust conflicts with the Code’s priority provisions and fundamental 
policies, and that a constructive trust should rarely be imposed postpetition.71 
This is an important opinion. It is difficult to argue with the court’s reasoning 
or conclusion: constructive trust is clearly an equitable remedy for the same 
causes of action to which monetary damages apply, and the Code clearly defines 
“claim” as including precisely that remedy. That a constructive trust remedy 
must be asserted by way of adversary proceeding does not remove it from the bar 
date: it either must be preserved in a timely proof of claim, or the adversary 
proceeding must be initiated prior to the bar date. The claim, even if not ripe, is 
certainly contingent and unliquidated, and all practitioners know that the bar 
date applies equally to unripe claims as to fully matured ones. This is neither 
 
 64. Thrasher v. Mandel (In re Mandel),—B.R.—, 2013 WL 4829150 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2013). 
 65. See id. at *1–2. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See id. at *4. 
 68. See id. at *3. 
 69. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5). 
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 71. See id. at *4–5. 
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unreasonable, unworkable, nor oppressive, and one would think that a debtor, a 
trustee, and all creditors should know sooner rather than later whether estate 
assets may be subject to constructive trust, for obvious reasons of planning and 
reliance. But more than that, constructive trust actions are frequently asserted 
and lead to substantial burden on litigants, debtors, and bankruptcy courts. 
Usually, they fail (the authors are not aware of any successful postpetition 
constructive trust action), but not before they consume substantial resources. 
Frequently, they are asserted for leverage purposes. The court in In re Mandel 
made it clear that the assertion of such claims, even if possible, will be held to 
the same strict requirements as all creditors are held to. 
V.  DISCHARGE/DISCHARGEABILITY 
A.  BULLOCK V. BANKCHAMPAIGN, N.A. 
Section 523(a)(4) excepts from discharge a debt “for fraud or defalcation 
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.”72 In Bullock,73 the 
Supreme Court considered the meaning of “defalcation.” 
The debtor was a non-professional trustee of a family trust created by his 
father.74 Over the years, the debtor borrowed money from the trust to purchase 
property for himself and his mother.75 Although the debtor always repaid the 
funds he borrowed, with interest, his brothers sued him in state court and 
obtained a judgment for breach of fiduciary duty, although the state court held 
that the debtor appears to not have had a malicious intent in borrowing the 
funds (and was instead guilty of self-dealing).76 In bankruptcy, the replacement 
trustee sought to deny the debtor’s discharge of his court-ordered debt for 
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. The issue before the Court was 
whether defalcation applies in the absence of any specific ill intent or loss of the 
trust principal. 
The Court began by reviewing the use of “defalcation” in bankruptcies 
commencing in 1867.77 The Court noted that there was no clear definition, and 
that appellate courts had long disagreed about the mental state that must be 
present for defalcation.78 Analyzing the term in proximity to the other terms 
(fraud, embezzlement, larceny), the Court favored an interpretation that would 
apply similar culpable mental states to defalcation, and the Court noted that 
exceptions to discharge should be confined to those that are “plainly 
expressed.”79 Thus, the Court construed defalcation for purposes of the statute 
as follows: 
Where the conduct at issue does not involve bad faith, moral turpitude, or 
 
 72. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). 
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other immoral conduct, the term requires an intentional wrong. We 
include as intentional not only conduct that the fiduciary knows is 
improper but also reckless conduct of the kind that the criminal law often 
treats as the equivalent. . . . Where actual knowledge of wrongdoing is 
lacking, we consider conduct as equivalent if the fiduciary consciously 
disregards (or is willfully blind to) a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
his conduct will turn out to violate a fiduciary duty. . . . That risk must be 
of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of 
the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard 
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding 
person would observe in the actor’s situation.80 
The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings, reversing the lower 
courts’ “objective recklessness” standard, with instructions to apply the 
heightened standard.81 
VI.  EQUITABLE MOOTNESS 
A.  WELLS FARGO N.A. V. TEXAS GRAND PRAIRIE HOTEL REALTY L.L.C. (IN RE 
TEXAS GRAND PRAIRIE HOTEL REALTY, L.L.C.) 
The authors have discussed at length in prior surveys that the Fifth Circuit 
has been clamping down on the doctrine of equitable mootness and has made it 
much harder to obtain dismissal of an appeal based on that doctrine. The Fifth 
Circuit visited the issue again in In re Texas Grand Prairie Hotel Realty, rejecting 
the application of the doctrine to the facts of the case.82 The question remaining 
is: if application of the doctrine was inappropriate in this case, then in which 
case would it still be appropriate? 
The overall issue before the circuit was the cramdown interest rate (as 
otherwise discussed in this Survey).83 The debtors argued that the appeal should 
be dismissed as equitably moot because, granting the lender the much higher 
interest rate the lender sought would make the plan unfeasible and impossible 
and would unwind the plan despite many postconfirmation transactions and 
payments.84 The debtors had made more than $8 million in postconfirmation 
payments to dozens of creditors, including cashing out entire classes under the 
plan.85 Additionally, the debtors sold the equity in their company under the 
plan in exchange for millions of dollars in funding from the new owner 
(affiliated with the old owner).86 The debtors argued that it would be impossible 
to unwind these transactions, recapture payments made to creditors, and 
compensate the purchaser of new equity for its payments.87 
The lender, very wisely, did not argue for the undoing of the plan in toto. 
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Instead, the lender argued that the circuit could reverse and remand in order to 
increase the cramdown interest rate to the maximum amount that could be 
borne by the debtors without necessarily unwinding the plan.88 The debtors 
responded that their plan was a zero sum game: all future cash flow was devoted 
to one or another creditor under the plan.89 Thus, being required to pay the 
lender greater interest would necessarily mean less funds to pay the other 
creditors what they were promised under the plan.90 The circuit rejected this 
argument, noting that, while the plan projections allocated every dollar to 
various creditors, actual results might be better.91 Moreover, during the last two 
plan years, the debtors projected net operating income of over $3 million that 
was not allocated to creditors, and which could be used to compensate the 
lender in the event a higher interest rate was required but which could not be 
sustained on a current basis.92 Thus, “the possibility exists that the Debtors 
could afford a fractional payout without reducing distributions to third-party 
claimants.”93 
One wonders whether the result may have been different had the circuit not 
otherwise affirmed the bankruptcy court and the 5% rate of interest. 
Nevertheless, the opinion is significant for two reasons. First, the Fifth Circuit 
appears willing to try to find any way possible to avoid dismissing an appeal for 
equitable mootness (as perhaps it should, since dismissing an otherwise 
meritorious appeal is a harsh remedy). Second, the lender approached the issue 
appropriately by not contesting (for equitable mootness purposes at least) the 
confirmation of the plan as a whole, but rather solely the interest rate, and by 
arguing that even if equitable mootness might prevent the much higher interest 
rate the lender wanted, there was very likely some higher amount of interest that 
the debtors could pay under their plan.94 This was the epitome of the saying that 
“pigs get fat and hogs get slaughtered,” and it worked for the lender. But it 
cannot be disputed that the net result is the trend to severely curtail the 
application of the equitable mootness doctrine. It will be interesting to see if the 
equitable mootness doctrine has any remaining relevance to Chapter 11 plan 
confirmations in the future. 
VII.  INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY 
A.  CREDIT UNION LIQUIDITY SERVICES, LLC V. GREEN HILLS DEV. CO. (IN THE 
MATTER OF GREEN HILLS DEV. CO. LLC) 
The Fifth Circuit considered the meaning of a bona fide dispute as to liability 
or amount for involuntary standing purposes, in the wake of the 2005 BAPCPA 
changes.95 In particular, the bankruptcy court (although it denied the 
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involuntary petition) applied a different standard to the bona fide dispute 
inquiry under section 303(b) of the Code than it did under section 303(h) of the 
Code.96 
Prior to BAPCPA, section 303(b) did not include the language: “as to liability 
or amount.”97 Rather, the statute referenced only a bona fide dispute, which the 
circuit had previously limited to liability (as opposed to amount).98 Previously, 
therefore, a “dispute as to the amount of the claim, even if as to the total 
amount of the claim (for example, through an offsetting counterclaim), was not 
considered a basis to deny standing.”99 However, by adding the phrase “as to 
liability or amount,” Congress clearly changed this precedent and, in the wake of 
BAPCPA, a bona fide dispute as to the amount of the debt, including as to 
liability, defeats the petitioning creditor’s standing.100 
This opinion confirms that the language of the statute, as changed by 
Congress, means what it says, undoubtedly making it harder to prove the 
elements necessary for an involuntary bankruptcy. 
VIII.  JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
A.  AXIS SURPLUS INS. CO. V. FLUGENCE (IN THE MATTER OF FLUGENCE) 
Practitioners are familiar with the Fifth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Reed v. 
City of Arlington, which held that, although a debtor was judicially estopped from 
pursuing a prepetition cause of action for his failure to disclose the same on his 
schedules, the debtor’s trustee should not be judicially estopped to pursue the 
cause of action for the benefit of the estate.101 In Flugence, the Circuit considered 
the question of whether, in such a case, the trustee was limited in the amount 
that he could seek to the amount of unpaid claims in the bankruptcy case.102 
As is too often the case, the debtor received a discharge without informing 
the bankruptcy court of the existence of an affirmative cause of action103 
(although here it was a Chapter 13 debtor and the cause of action only arose 
postpetition, which is unlike most judicial estoppel cases where the cause of 
action exists as of the petition date and must clearly be disclosed on the 
schedules).104 The defendant, recognizing that the trustee would not be estopped 
from pursuing the claim, argued that any recovery should be limited to the debts 
remaining outstanding.105 
The circuit noted that the debtor had a continuing duty to disclose assets, 
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including those that arose postpetition.106 While the claim arose not only 
postpetition but also postconfirmation, the confirmation order specified that 
property of the estate would vest in the debtor only upon discharge, which 
would be years later given the nature of Chapter 13.107 Thus, the debtor had a 
duty to disclose the asset and, by her failure to do so, she implicitly represented 
that the asset did not exist.108 The circuit agreed that the debtor was judicially 
estopped to pursue the claim.109 With respect to whether the trustee was limited 
in pursuing the claim just for the amount of unpaid claims, however, the circuit 
concluded that there was no such limitation.110 Although the opinion is not 
clear with respect to what this means, the defendant had argued that “it would 
be inconsistent with the goals of bankruptcy to allow the trustee to pursue a 
claim where, as here, it would disproportionately benefit the attorneys over the 
creditors.”111 The court rejected this argument, noting that not being able to pay 
an attorney would thwart the goal of the Code to maximize assets.112 Moreover, 
the Code provided for a mechanism to ensure that attorneys were only fairly 
compensated.113 
Ultimately, the holding is clear: “where a debtor is judicially estopped from 
pursuing a claim he failed to disclose to the bankruptcy court, the trustee . . . 
may pursue the claim without any limitation not otherwise imposed by law.”114 
What is unclear is whether any of the benefit of the claim or its proceeds may 
flow to the judicially estopped debtor (i.e., trustee obtains sufficient proceeds to 
pay all claims, leaving an amount that would otherwise be distributed to the 
debtor). Given that the Fifth Circuit was clearly troubled (as it always has been) 
with a debtor benefiting from its failure to disclose, and that the discussion 
involved administrative claims and not any benefit to the debtor, it may well be 
that a trustee would be capped at a recovery amount that ensured no benefit to 
the debtor, although this is not the literal language of the holding. On the other 
hand, judicial estoppel is applied against the plaintiff and not against the claim.115 
While the debtor may not be a plaintiff, if someone else can be the plaintiff, the 
underlying claim is still the same as it otherwise is under nonbankruptcy law. If 
that claim entitles the plaintiff to an award of X, then that should be the award 
regardless of whether the plaintiff is the debtor or the trustee, unless the Code 
alters the elements applicable to nonbankruptcy causes of action—which it does 
not. Moreover, with a trustee as the plaintiff, the trustee would have a sound 
business reason to compromise a claim at an amount that does not provide 
recovery to the debtor, thereby providing any potential “punishment” to the 
debtor as a result of the failure to disclose. 
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IX.  JURISDICTION 
A.  IN THE MATTER OF FRAZIN 
The courts continue to struggle with Stern v. Marshall, as has been noted in 
prior Surveys.116 In this Survey period, the primary struggle was whether parties 
could consent to the bankruptcy court’s entry of a final judgment in a non-core 
proceeding. By the time that this Survey is published (or shortly thereafter), the 
Supreme Court will have considered this issue in In re Bellingham Insurance 
Agency, Inc.117 Practitioners will almost certainly be aware of the results of the 
Supreme Court’s review and, if they are not, they should immediate familiarize 
themselves with the opinion. The authors can only hope that the Supreme 
Court will not write section 157(c)(2) out of the Judiciary Code as the 
implications for bankruptcy practice are grave indeed (unless Congress is finally 
prepared to make bankruptcy courts Article III courts, which would save the 
judiciary and litigants massive uncertainty and massive attorney’s fees, but is, 
alas, a likely pipe dream). 
In the meantime, practitioners must contend with a potentially devastating 
opinion from the Fifth Circuit although, unless the Supreme Court avoids the 
issue, the Fifth Circuit’s opinion will be replaced with the results in In re 
Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. 
In In the Matter of Frazin, the Fifth Circuit considered a now-standard Stern v. 
Marshall issue as it affects state law counterclaims against court-approved 
counsel.118 The Chapter 13 debtor retained counsel under the Code, and that 
counsel helped recover millions of dollars in recovery for the estate.119 Counsel 
filed applications with the bankruptcy court for the approval of its fees, but the 
debtor objected.120 However, the debtor not only objected, but also asserted 
state law counterclaims against the attorneys for negligence, breach of duty, and 
the Texas DTPA.121 The bankruptcy court overruled the objection and allowed 
the fees as requested, denying the counterclaims in the process.122 
Applying Stern v. Marshall, the Circuit Court concluded that the bankruptcy 
court had the authority to enter final judgment on the negligence and breach of 
duty claims, but not on the Texas DTPA claim.123 This is because “resolution of 
the fee application proceedings necessarily resolved the malpractice 
counterclaim,” as well as the breach of duty counterclaim, as both such 
counterclaims had to be resolved in order for the bankruptcy court to adjudicate 
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the attorneys’ entitlement to fees.124 With respect to the Texas DTPA claim, 
however, the Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional 
authority to enter judgment, as the resolution of that claim was not necessary to 
the fee applications. However, the Circuit also concluded, rather strangely, that 
“all factual determinations made in the course of analyzing Frazin’s DTPA claim 
were within the court’s constitutional authority because they were necessarily 
resolved in the process of adjudicating the fee applications.”125 Presumably this 
would mean that, if the debtor pursues the Texas DTPA claim, the same 
findings of fact would apply, although this is left unresolved. 
But none of the above is the true importance of In the Matter of Frazin, for the 
above is a straightforward application of Stern v. Marshall. Rather, what is the 
most important aspect of this opinion is the Circuit’s discussion of consent to 
the entry of final judgment in a non-core proceeding.126 Here, the debtor 
brought his counterclaims in the bankruptcy court voluntarily, and appeared to 
have at least implicitly consented to final judgment over non-core matters.127 
The attorneys argued that, as a result, the bankruptcy court had full authority to 
render final judgment on all causes of action.128 The Circuit rejected this 
argument in a footnote as follows: 
However, when separation of powers is implicated in a given case, the 
parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty. When these 
Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be 
dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the 
parties cannot be expected to protect. As discussed above, Stern makes clear 
that the practice of bankruptcy courts entering final judgments in certain 
state-law counterclaims compromises the integrity of the system of 
separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system. Thus, 
structural concerns cannot be ameliorated by Frazin’s consent or waiver.129 
In other words, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) is unconstitutional, although the court 
did not state so. No other conclusion is possible, however, if consent to final 
judgment does not grant authority in non-core proceedings. That the circuit 
would so state, in a footnote, with no real analysis, and seemingly ipse dixit, is 
troubling, to say the least. 
B.  IN RE BP RE, L.P. 
In In the Matter of BP RE, L.P., the Fifth Circuit held the same as it did in In 
the Matter of Frazin, to the effect that consent does not confer authority to enter 
final judgment in non-core matters.130 At least in In the Matter of BP RE, L.P., the 
Circuit so held after an analysis and citation, and not in a footnote. But the 
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result is surprising and shows the games that will be played without a clear 
directive from the Supreme Court on the lingering fallout from Stern v. Marshall. 
Here the result is that a litigant, having commenced an action in bankruptcy 
court and having explicitly consented to final judgment—particularly as the 
debtor—was able to escape and reverse course when things did not go its way.131 
The debtor filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court asserting 
various state law claims against the defendants.132 The bankruptcy court entered 
a final judgment against debtor-plaintiff, and the debtor-plaintiff appealed.133 Of 
importance, the debtor-plaintiff filed a document with the bankruptcy court 
explicitly stating that the proceeding was non-core and explicitly consenting to 
the bankruptcy court’s entry of final judgment.134 After the bankruptcy court 
denied the plaintiff’s request for a jury, the plaintiff sought to withdraw the 
reference and argued that it had not consented to final judgment by the 
bankruptcy court.135 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the bankruptcy court 
lacked authority to enter final judgment in light of Stern v. Marshall—even though 
the plaintiff was the debtor, even though the plaintiff filed suit in the 
bankruptcy court, and even though the plaintiff explicitly consented to final 
judgment.136 
The Fifth Circuit first looked at whether the proceeding was statutorily core 
and whether the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to enter final 
judgment, both of which questions the circuit answered in the affirmative.137 
Although the Circuit was certainly concerned with the plaintiff’s 
“gamesmanship,” the circuit nevertheless held that the Constitution required 
analysis of the bankruptcy court’s power, in effect testing the constitutionality of 
section 157(c)(2) of the Judiciary Code.138 The court adopted the reasoning of 
the Sixth Circuit from its Waldman case, and concluded that consent to final 
judgment in a non-core proceeding was insufficient.139 As held by the Fifth 
Circuit: 
Where a structural interest is triggered, the parties cannot by consent cure 
the constitutional difficulty for the same reason that the parties by consent 
cannot confer on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond the 
limitations imposed by Article III, § 2. When these Article III limitations 
are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because 
the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be 
expected to protect.140 
The Circuit Court proceeded to construe and apply Stern v. Marshall broadly, 
even though it noted that the opinion was intended to address a narrow 
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question.141 Accordingly, the Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court 
lacked constitutional authority over the action notwithstanding the consent of 
the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2).142 The court reiterated what it stated in 
Frazin: “separation of powers is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by 
consent cure the constitutional difficulty. When these Article III limitations are 
at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the 
limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to 
protect.”143 
The Fifth Circuit should not have engaged in a jurisdictional analysis. Inability 
to confer or consent to jurisdiction applies just to that—jurisdiction. But there 
should have been no question of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1334, and it is that statute that is the subject matter jurisdiction 
statute. Authority to enter judgment is something different and, whatever it is, it 
should not be subject to the inability to consent issue. Unless, that is, parties 
should be unable to consent to a magistrate judge—something that the circuit 
attempts to address, again in a footnote, without much success.144 Magistrates 
are not implicated because of the need for consent of all parties and because the 
district court may vacate the reference sua sponte.145 But that is also precisely the 
case with respect to bankruptcy. And reading Stern v. Marshall as “a narrow 
holding not affecting magistrate judges” is strange, given that the opinion reads 
Stern v. Marshall broadly by its own admission.146 
What about arbitration? Parties agree to an arbitration and, with very limited 
exceptions, a federal court must enter judgment on the verdict and must enforce 
the judgment.147 Does this not offend the dignity of the federal courts? And why 
would bankruptcy courts endanger the “institutional interests” of Article III 
courts? After Northern Pipeline, circuit courts appoint, discipline, and remove 
bankruptcy judges, and district courts do not have to refer matters to bankruptcy 
courts. Here again the circuit appears to proclaim ipse dixit without much 
analysis. If anything, the courts should focus on agency reviews, which are de 
facto courts appointed by the executive and, while judicial review is available, it is 
limited. With respect to bankruptcy courts, the district court can always 
withdraw the reference and there are appeals. 
One can understand the need to protect Article III of the Constitution and 
the importance of the Article III judiciary being vigilant against the 
encroachment of its power. Goals of efficiency and expediency are no license to 
violate the Constitution. In an academic setting, cases like Stern v. Marshall, and 
now In the Matter of BP RE, L.P. and In the Matter of Frazin, have intellectual 
appeal and probably represent exactly the kind of healthy territorial 
defensiveness that the Founding Fathers wanted to motivate in our three equal 
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branches of government. Those practitioners that disagree with the logic of these 
and similar cases, and certainly their results, perhaps arrive at their views not so 
much based on cold academics, or on the need for broad Constitutional 
principles that will govern for decades or centuries, but based on the knowledge 
that these opinions are making it significantly harder to administer 
bankruptcies. And it certainly can be of no comfort to bankruptcy judges, who 
work exceptionally hard and who have huge case loads, and who probably try 
the bulk of civil issues in the federal system, and who publish many opinions on 
difficult civil and commercial issues that benefit all, to hear of their 
Constitutional irrelevance. Or, perhaps it is precisely because bankruptcy judges 
are deciding so many civil and commercial cases, and issuing so many opinions 
on which many other courts, federal and state, rely, that curtailing their 
authority appears necessary. But then why do Article III district courts decide so 
many fewer commercial cases (or publish fewer opinions)? 
This debate will not end. Everyone will continue to be frustrated by it, and 
the parties who will suffer the most are litigants, who must expend substantial 
and precious resources in arguing jurisdictional issues in almost every case of any 
size and who, it appears, may not have quite the finality that they believed 
bankruptcy brings. There is only one cure, which is to make bankruptcy judges 
Article III judges, albeit of limited subject matter. This will not happen any time 
soon, the same as it did not happen in 1978.148 In light of that fact, the authors 
can only encourage Article III courts, and district courts in particular, to be 
more accommodating to the practical needs and realities of bankruptcy litigants, 
who may find themselves having to try matters in district court far more often 
than district courts are used to.149 
X.  LIEN AVOIDANCE (SECTION 1146(C)) 
A.  ACCEPTANCE LOAN CO. V. S. WHITE TRANSPORTATION, INC. (IN RE S. WHITE 
TRANSPORTATION, INC.) 
Section 1141(c) of the Bankruptcy Code generally provides that, “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in the plan or in the order confirming the plan, after 
confirmation of a plan, the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all 
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners 
in the debtor.”150 On the other hand, there is the long-standing rule that a 
secured creditor may ignore the bankruptcy proceedings and that his lien will 
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pass through bankruptcy unaffected.151 How then do you reconcile these two 
conflicting principles? 
The Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in In the Matter of S. White Transportation, 
Inc.152 The secured creditor never filed a proof of claim or participated in the 
Chapter 11 case.153 However, the debtor did serve the secured creditor with the 
debtor’s plan, which provided for no recovery to the secured creditor (and noted 
that the debtor contested the validity of the creditor’s lien).154 The plan was 
confirmed and the debtor argued that, as a result of section 1141(c) of the Code, 
the property revested free and clear of the lien and the creditor “participated” in 
the bankruptcy case as a result of being served with the debtor’s plan.155 
The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the debtor and held that the lien was not 
avoided.156 The Court recognized the rule that four conditions must be met in 
order for a lien to be avoided under section 1141(c) of the Code: “(1) the plan 
must be confirmed; (2) the property that is subject to the lien must be dealt with 
by the plan; (3) the lien holder must participate in the reorganization; and (4) 
the plan must not preserve the lien.”157 The issue was the third element—did the 
creditor, simply by being served with the plan, “participate” in the 
reorganization? 
The court recognized that this requirement was a judicial gloss on the 
statute.158 Nevertheless, the Circuit noted that “that the word ‘participation’ 
connotes activity, and not mere nonfeasance.”159 One method of participation 
in the bankruptcy case is the filing of a claim.160 Thus, the court concluded that 
“meeting the participation requirement . . . requires more than mere passive 
receipt of effective notice.”161 
This is a troubling opinion, and a potentially dangerous one. Certainly 
jurisdiction and due process are critical to Chapter 11, but the Fifth Circuit did 
not address the question under either principle. Indeed, the debtor actually 
served the plan on the creditor.162 What the court failed to address was finality—
a critical issue in Chapter 11.163 The debtor and all parties, including new 
lenders or new capital funders, must have finality and certainty in knowing what 
the debtor’s obligations and liens postconfirmation are. The Circuit Court also 
seems to have failed to apply its own precedent, to the effect that the courts 
should not rewrite or add to a clear statute.164 The Circuit seems to have ignored 
section 1141(a) of the Code, providing for the binding effect of a plan. And 
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what about discharge: if a creditor does not file a proof of claim but is served 
with a plan, will the creditor’s claim no longer be discharged? After all, what is 
the difference between lien avoidance under section 1141(c) and one of a whole 
number of other things that happen upon plan confirmation and effectiveness 
vis a vis a party that has not “participated” in the case, other than the 
pronouncement that a secured creditor may pass his lien through bankruptcy? 
And, how can that judicial pronouncement trump the explicit provisions of the 
Code, provided of course that due process is complied with? 
But most troubling of all is the lack of any meaningful discussion or 
consideration of what constitutes “participation,” other than the simple filing of 
a proof of claim, which is a circular argument (since the whole issue arises 
precisely because the creditor has not filed a claim). Can the debtor file an 
adversary proceeding against the creditor pre-confirmation to force 
“participation?” Perhaps, but then the creditor “participates” in the adversary 
proceeding. Can the debtor file a zero amount proof of claim for the creditor? 
Sure, but how would that not be the same kind of passive participation by the 
creditor as is the case with a plan. Can the debtor file a claim for the creditor 
and object to the claim, including on the basis of an invalid lien? But what if the 
lien is valid and the only basis for avoidance is section 1141(c)? 
It may be that In the Matter of S. White Transportation, Inc. will not be as 
important or dangerous as feared, once the practitioner is aware that service of 
the plan by itself will not lead to lien avoidance for a non-participating secured 
creditor (which is perhaps a wake up call to Chapter 11 practitioners, many of 
whom probably believed that section 1146(c) meant exactly what it says). But it 
will be up to careful and potentially creative practitioners and courts to provide 
meaningful guidance and examples of what “participation” without a filed claim 
means. The Fifth Circuit, unfortunately, has provided none. 
As is, without some coerced “participation,” it may be that a secured creditor 
can effectively veto a Chapter 11 plan that depends on the treatment of the 
creditor’s lien by simply not filing a claim. And, if the current jurisdictional 
discussion continues to proceed in the direction that it has, then does the 
bankruptcy court even have any jurisdiction over the creditor or its lien if the 
creditor does not consent to bankruptcy jurisdiction by filing a claim? The day 
will come when a major secured creditor, who does not wish to be crammed 
down, will simply not file a claim. Someone will try to file a claim for the 
creditor, and the creditor will argue that the bankruptcy court will not have 
jurisdiction, or certainly not core jurisdiction, not only over lien avoidance but 
any lien modification at all, because the creditor has not subjected himself 
voluntarily to such jurisdiction. In light of Stern and Fifth Circuit precedent on 
non-core matters, what will the counterargument be? Or will the matter have to 
proceed in district court? Section 1146(c) is the most important inducement to 
bring secured creditors into the bankruptcy process, since they would certainly 
much rather face the prospect of negotiations, a plan, and maybe a cramdown, 
than the loss of their lien outright. But if that carrot and stick is gutted—as the 
Fifth Circuit appears to have done—then why would a secured creditor 
participate in Chapter 11 at all? 
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XI.  SALES 
A.  NEWCO ENERGY V. ENERGYTEC INC. (IN RE ENERGYTEC INC.) 
Practitioners know, and rely upon the fact that, most bankruptcy section 363 
sales are protected from reversal on appeal, which is a major benefit of 
bankruptcy sales and one of the reasons why bankruptcies are filed (in order 
than fair value may be obtained for an asset which was otherwise subject to 
competing claims outside of bankruptcy). The Fifth Circuit addressed the appeal 
mootness issue in In re Energytec Inc., in an opinion that may threaten this 
bedrock policy and tool of the Code.165 
The debtor sold its pipeline during the bankruptcy case, and the bankruptcy 
court reserved the issue of whether the sale was free and clear of the appellant’s 
fees and interests in the pipeline (apparently because the sale could not be free 
and clear of covenants running with the land).166 The ultimate underlying issue 
concerned whether the appellant’s rights were covenants running with the land, 
which the bankruptcy court, approximately one year after the sale, ruled they 
were not.167 The appellant did not obtain a stay pending appeal.168 The debtor 
argued that the appeal was moot under section 363(m) of the Code.169 The 
circuit eventually reversed the lower court’s conclusion on whether the 
appellant’s rights were covenants running with the land, thereby raising the issue 
at relief, if any, the circuit could grant with respect to the sale.170 
The circuit recounted the strong policies behind section 363(m) and the 
paramount goal of finality in bankruptcy sales.171 However, the Circuit noted 
that the appellant was not challenging the sale per se, but rather only the aspect 
of the sale concerning whether the sale was free and clear of the appellant’s 
rights.172 Crucially, the bankruptcy court carved this issue out of the sale order 
for adjudication at a future date, and only one year later did the bankruptcy 
court adjudicate the issue.173 Apparently, the buyer decided to proceed in the 
face of the potential legal and financial risks involved concerning the appellant’s 
claims.174 
As held by the court, section 363(m) applies “when the challenged provision 
is ‘integral to the sale’ of the debtor’s assets, which occurs ‘if the provision is so 
closely linked to the agreement governing the sale that modifying or reversing 
the provision would adversely alter the parties’ bargained-for exchange.’”175 
While this applies to sales, it can also apply to an aspect of a sale concerning the 
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free and clear provision of section 363(f) of the Code.176 Thus, section 363(m) of 
the Code may apply to a free and clear aspect of a sale order if “the purchaser 
would not have consummated the sale without assurance that it was acquiring 
control of the debtor’s business, and the provisions for lien release, claims 
satisfaction, and distribution were essential to acquisition of control.”177 Here, 
the buyer agreed to buy the pipeline notwithstanding the carve out from section 
363(f) of the appellant’s rights.178 Thus, the buyer demonstrated through its 
actions that it would have closed the sale even without the free and clear 
protection.179 Equally as important (and hence why the opinion may be limited 
to its facts) is the fact that the appellant could not have moved for a stay pending 
appeal at the time of the sale order, thereby potentially avoiding section 363(m) 
of the Code, because the bankruptcy court had not adjudicated its rights until 
more than one year later.180 It would be unfair and unworkable (and potentially 
more prejudicial to the bankruptcy estate) for the appellant to move for a stay 
pending appeal at a time when it was not known whether the buyer’s rights 
would even be implicated and whether the buyer would even need to move for a 
stay pending appeal. 
The result, while probably technically correct, and while recognizing that 
section 363(m) applies not only to the sale itself but also to any free and clear 
provision integral to the sale, nevertheless limits the application of section 
363(m) of the Code. Given that this is one of the most important tools that is 
used to increase value to an estate, any limitation on the section should be as 
narrow as possible. The problem in this case was that the buyer agreed to the 
sale notwithstanding the potential that it might not be free and clear of the 
appellant’s rights, and that the bankruptcy court took one year to resolve those 
rights, by which time the eggs had been scrambled. Had the buyer not so agreed, 
the result may well have been different. But then, there may well have been no 
sale, or a sale would have been for greater consideration. That is the problem. 
On the one hand, the estate needs to monetize the asset for as much as possible, 
and sometimes as quickly as possible. On the other hand, the due process rights 
of a claimant must be honored. Usually this is accomplished by attaching the 
claim to the proceeds of the sale. This case, however, demonstrates the 
difficulties that may be involved when the claimant’s right is not the type of 
interest in property that can be easily sold free and clear, and which does not 
therefore attach to the proceeds. Parties to such a sale must be aware of these 
potential issues as soon as possible, either to procedurally and substantively 
position themselves for section 363(m) protection, or to put in place alternate 
protection that will still enable the sale to proceed, while protection potential in 
rem claimants, such as escrow accounts. 
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XII.  TAXES 
A.  HALL V. UNITED STATES 
Most practitioners assume that postpetition taxes automatically become taxes 
against the estate payable as administrative claims under section 503(b) of the 
Code. The Supreme Court visited the issue and the intersection of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the Internal Revenue Code in Hall v. United States.181 
This was a Chapter 12 case.182 During the case, the debtor sold his farm, 
which triggered a capital gains tax.183 The precise question was the treatment of 
this tax under the debtor’s Chapter 12 plan, but more generally the question 
was whether the tax, being incurred postpetition, was a tax “incurred by the 
estate.”184 Reviewing sections 1222, 503, and 507 of the Code, the Court noted 
that the tax is a liability of the estate, as opposed to the debtor, only if 
“incurred” by the estate.185 In other words, section 503(b) does not accord 
immediate administrative claim status for any postpetition taxes that may be 
assessed against a debtor; just those actually incurred by the estate itself as a legal 
entity.186 In this respect, and reviewing the Internal Revenue Code, the Court 
held that the estate in Chapter 12 is not a legal entity subject to being taxed.187 
Because the estate itself in Chapter 12 is not subject to being taxed under non-
bankruptcy law, there is no tax “incurred” by the estate and the Code does not 
change this result.188 
This is an interesting opinion, and perhaps surprising to some, given the 
assumption that postpetition taxes are automatically administrative claims. 
However, the opinion is likely limited to Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 cases. 
There is one potential consequence that may be of relevance to Chapter 11. 
Under the Internal Revenue Code, and as held by Hall, an estate is ordinarily 
not a taxable entity.189 The exception is Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 “in which 
the debtor is an individual.”190 It therefore seems that, if the Chapter 11 debtor 
is a corporation, there may be no taxable entity and no postpetition taxes against 
the estate. Of course, in order to confirm a plan, taxes against both the estate 
and the debtor must be addressed, so at the Chapter 11 plan stage it may be 
irrelevant whether the estate is a taxable entity or not. The more interesting 
question is what happens in the event of a conversion or dismissal? 
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